Throughout the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian crisis, on top of complicated geopolitical events unfolding, global markets have undergone dramatic shifts and experienced high levels of volatility which has made investors balk. Many major news outlets have attributed this market activity to the inability of the financial community to quantify market uncertainty and predict the future of crises like this one. These trends have been observed at scale in commodities markets.

Our view, at Global Guessing, is that commodities markets and futures markets for said commodities are, at their core, the manifestation of conditional forecasts which are predicated on predictions regarding larger geopolitical activity.

As such, the goal of this article is to marry geopolitical events, forecasts, and market activity to better understand the drivers of market movements and how crowd forecasts can aid in providing clarity in environments of widespread uncertainty.

Today we are looking at the two commodities markets we have been tracking on our Russia-Ukraine Forecasting Guide: wheat and aluminum.

Wheat

Since the start of Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, wheat has arguably been the most heavily scrutinized and followed commodity. And there is a good reason for this. Combined, Russia and Ukraine supply close to one third of the world’s wheat and barley exports. Furthermore, several countries have wheat import concentration with these countries, namely Egypt (70%), Tunisia (80%), and Lebanon (60%).

While Egypt is generally viewed as a relatively stable and growing economy, with a population over 100 million, the latter two countries have undergone severe political (and economic) turmoil over the last two years. A shortage of wheat, the backbone of many developing economies, and especially so for Arab nations which rely on bread as a cultural staple, poses both economic and political risks.

On our Russia-Ukraine forecasting resource page we have tracked forecasts hosted by Good Judgment Open on the question “Will US What Prices be >$1,075 by June 15.”

On February 26th users forecasted a 10% likelihood that wheat prices would surpass $1,075 by June 15th. By March 9th, just over a week later, users had raised their collective forecast nine-fold, resulting in a 90% probability that wheat would surpass  $1,075. As of March 14th, that number has regressed to 64%.

Interestingly, this market about wheat prices maps inversely with the several markets which forecast the end of this conflict. As the likelihood of a peace deal or a ceasefire decreased, forecasts on the price of US wheat rose. And similarly, as the crowd has become more confident in a peace deal or ceasefire, or even a meeting between Putin and Zelensky, forecasts on wheat prices have seen dramatic falls.

While correlation does not denote causation, it seems reasonable that high wheat prices indicate a belief that this conflict will protracted, while signs of potential peace in Eastern Europe seem to lower confidence in wheat’s future (no pun intended).

Now this observation raises a slew of additional questions, namely what is driving these forecasts around peace between Russia and Ukraine? For those answers, you should read tomorrow's newsletter about constraints on a potential peace and what each side will require if negotiations are to be successful.

In this way you will be able to track the factors which are critical to a peace deal, which will drive your forecast on how this conflict will end, which will in turn allow you to have a perspective on how US wheat prices will move in the coming weeks.

It is important to mention that there are other factors affecting wheat’s rapid price spike in 2022, including significant growth momentum through 2021 due to Covid-19 related supply-chain shortages. Anticipatory buying ensued of products tangential to wheat, like corn and soybeans, especially from deep pockets like China which also continued to prices rising. However, these commodities prices reached a point where even China committed to more domestic production of these goods over buying them, lowering the country's demand and reliance on imports in these sectors. The key drivers to understand wheat’s current price movement lies in geopolitical circumstance which is what we’re tracking at Global Guessing.

Aluminum

Compared to wheat, the story of aluminum's recent price activity is vastly more complicated.

On our Russia-Ukraine forecasting resource page we have also tracked forecasts hosted by Good Judgment Open on the question “Will Aluminum Prices be >=$3,200 by April 29th?” On February 7th users forecasted a 7% likelihood that aluminum would reach this price point by the of April. As of March 15th, this forecast has quickly and steadily risen to 81%. And it seems primed to continue rising.

The first thing to note about the movement of this forecast is that, whereas the wheat market seems to have risen quickly and later corrected, this aluminum price market rose steadily over the course of six weeks and appears to be more confident about its assertions.

So what accounts for this steady confidence?

For one, Russian company Rusal is the second largest producer of aluminum in the world, only behind China’s Hongqiao Group. Since the start of Russia’s invasion into Ukraine, the company has weathered a $6 billion sell-off in Hong Kong, and halted trading in Moscow after the company’s stock fell 42%. And despite claims from spokespeople that the company’s ability to transact has not been hindered by Western sanctions, its largest domestic bank lenders have been hit by the US Treasury Department. As such, concerns around supply are warranted.

On the demand side of this equation, low supply (both from the aforementioned Covid-19 drivers as well as the ongoing conflict in Ukraine) has resulted in an emptying of aluminum coffers globally. In turn, the need to restock supplies has been rampant. Additionally, innovation in the auto and aerospace sectors have driven a need for aluminum.

While aluminum's price activity does not cleanly map onto any military or political forecasts which we have been tracking, that in itself is a signal. This confidence may stem from forecasters believing that Western sanctions have inflicted some permanent or long-term damage to Russia’s economy that justify higher aluminum prices in the future, something we explored at Global Guessing. This confidence may also come from a lack of substitute goods, whereas there may be some for wheat.

Whether the former or the later, watching aluminum’s price movement on our resources guide, and understanding any decrease in forecaster belief within the context of the big-picture forecasts on this Russia-Ukraine conflict should provide you with a stable framework for understanding what is driving this increase in price assumptions. And again, we encourage you to read tomorrow's newsletter about constraints on a potential peace deal, to better understand our views on sanctions and Russia’s economic viability post-war.

We are not currently tracking forecasts on other key commodities tied to this conflict, such as oil, nickel, or natural gas…but we can! If you would appreciate having more commodities markets on our resources page, or more articles like this linking those commodities to our geopolitical forecasts, reach out to us on Twitter or leave a comment below with our new comment feature!

Twelve days ago, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. In the days since, Andrew and I have tracked relevant forecasts, collected signals, and debated the high-order questions defining the latest chapter in the Russo-Ukrainian War. In today’s newsletter, we’ll begin our forecasting effort aimed at understanding the war and its potential implications. To do so, we need to describe the key elements of the conflict and identify potential outcomes and the relevant constraints of actors.

Before the invasion, the keystone question of the conflict was whether Russia would invade Ukraine. This question captured the relevant dynamics of the conflict and aggregated their potential outcomes:

1. Was Putin bluffing on his demands?
2. Would Ukraine meet its Minsk-II requirements?
3. Would the US provide security concessions in Europe?
4. Would the West risk conflict with Russia over Ukrainian sovereignty?
5. Would the favorable structural and environmental conditions for Russia continue?
6. Would Xi intervene against Russian ambitions?

Although not all these questions are settled (surprisingly #4 and potentially #6), prior to invasion they all had small and diminishing probabilities of resolving positively (except for maybe #5 which carried great uncertainty). Now that Russia has invaded Ukraine, is there a singular question which can be used as a replacement guide for the conflict? Maybe. For now though, we’ve chosen four key questions—two forecastable, two predictable:

1. Will an agreement be reached by all parties in the Russo-Ukrainian War before, or shortly after, the fall of Kyiv?
2. Will the Russian government collapse before, or shortly after, Q1 is resolved?
3. How long until Q1 resolves?
4. Which parties will be involved in an agreement ending the Russo-Ukrainian War and what role will they occupy?

We feel these questions capture the two-sided nature of the conflict, as well as the indicators necessary for identifying signals and shaping constraints.

Independently, Q1 is simple and asks whether the conflict will come to an end before it escalates into a prolonged war (a Ukrainian government based outside of Kyiv, likely Lviv), an insurgency (a Ukrainian government in exile), or an enduring conflict (large scale fighting stops, but larger geopolitical tensions persist). Similarly, Q2 asks whether the cost of the war will become overbearing for the Kremlin such that it collapses in response. Together, questions one and two capture the dynamics of the two-front war taking place, while Q3 and Q4 map out the scale across:

• The military campaign: Waged by Russia and supported by Belarus, against Ukraine supported by the United States, NATO, and the European Union.
• The economic and political campaign: Waged by the US, EU, and allies against Russia supported by China.

The Military War

On the military front, the advantage is in favor of Russia despite the dubious feasibility of its end goals. Yes, Ukrainian resistance has been fiercer than expected. But many things can be true at the same time. So while Ukrainian resistance has been better than expected and Russian progress worse than expected, it can also be true that Russia has made considerable progress and Ukraine has taken considerable losses.

On the battlefield, a picture is emerging. Russian forces have made significant territorial gains—particularly in the South, but across the East of the country through Kyiv too. At the same time, Russian forces secured Ukraine’s largest nuclear power plant and are moving to secure more energy infrastructure. The crucial question will be to what degree their advance slows, whether by Ukrainian counterattacks, resistance in occupied cities, or logistical difficulties.

(There is also an important point to make regarding territory, which is that much of Russian gains have been primarily on roads. However, here too progress has been steadily increasing, and importantly, people live by roads.)

At the same time, however, such gains have come at a cost. Higher than expected, most likely. Yesterday, Ukraine reported that over 11,000 Russian soldiers have been killed since the invasion. The day prior, almost 10,000. Moreover, recent US assessments have aligned with the Ukrainian figures (although not always the case). To cap it off, recent numbers from Russia have been roughly in-line with these numbers. In addition, Russia has lost a significant number of aircraft and other expensive military assets, and have so far faced logistical issues and resistance in occupied or sieged cities.

However, cost does not equal defeat nor a shift in the larger strategic picture. While little has been released about casualties suffered by the Ukrainian military, US officials and analysts we follow have described them as “significant” and we remember one source identifying a ⅔ ratio of losses relative to Russia. In addition, Ukraine has likely suffered greater material losses than Russia. On March 2, CNN reported that US officials assessed Russia lost 3-5% of its military assets inside Ukraine, while Ukraine had lost 10% of its total capabilities. These numbers are old, and some signs indicate Russia is losing perhaps more significant amounts of equipment.

Given the desperate pleas for a No Fly Zone by Ukraine and efforts by the US and others to supply the country with fighter jets, one has to assume Ukraine is continuing to suffer significant material losses too. Still, Western military aid has been and will continue to be a crucial variable at play. More than 17,000 anti-tank weapons, among other aid, have been delivered to Ukraine, and there are no signs of it stopping. There are also some indications that the issues facing the Russian military are being experienced by Ukraine too.

Finally, there are some other factors to consider, such as troop exhaustion and morale. While both have been cited as present or potential issues, their effect or likelihood is unclear. We are still tracking these as potential signals given the potential of this stage of the conflict to persist for months (with the fall of cities such as Kharkiv taking weeks and Kyiv potentially months).

Questions & Objectives

As we follow the military war, our key questions are:

1. Will shifts in the Russian operation (shifting from weeks-long to months-long posture; deployment of further assets from inside Russia [but not troops]; the potential use of conscripts; etc.) alleviate Russian issues on the battlefield?
2. Will Western aid and assistance continue to be sufficient in propping up Ukrainian resistance (most likely requiring an escalation in terms of scale)?
3. Will Ukrainian resistance increase or decrease as more cities fall under Russian occupation, both in occupied and unoccupied territory, and more people flee the country?
4. How will Russia respond to questions 2 and 3? How will the West counter?

These questions we feel will shape the strategic trajectory of the battlefield war. And given the the situation and the questions posed above, we can consider the objectives of the various actors as:

• Ukraine: Resist Russian aggression and facilitate further Western involvement.
• Russia: Secure territory across the Southern coast, across the East, and through to Kyiv as quickly as possible.
• The West: Prolong Ukrainian resistance while avoiding direct conflict with Russia.

Russia wants to win this stage of the military war before they lose to the economic and political one, while Ukraine and the West want to extend the former to win the latter.

The Economic & Political War

On the economic and political front, the advantage is in favor of the West and Ukraine. Prior to invasion, this war was the one waged by Putin as he pressured the Zelensky regime into implementing Minsk-II, sought binding international agreements by various parties on security guarantees, and sabotaged the Ukrainian economy with the threat of force. Since the invasion began, however, this war has been escalated by the West who now hold the advantage over Russia. The key question is will it be fought hard enough and won fast enough?

In response to Russian aggression, the United States, European Union, and their associated allies have waged a great economic and political campaign against Russia. The actions taken included cutting out a number of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, freezing Russian reserves in foreign countries, and isolating Russia from the wider international world.

As a result, the Russian economy has been severely harmed. JPMorgan projects Russian GDP will contract 35% in the second quarter of 2022 and 7% for the entire year. The Russian government has limited capital withdrawals from the country and kept financial markets closed. The country has also faced growing protests at home, including some politicians and oligarchs speaking out against the invasion. As a result, Russia has cracked down on the remnants of independent media and passed legislation aimed to silence dissidence. Moreover, Russia has become increasingly isolated, resulting in a large-margin condemnation by the United Nations and the departure of many multinational corporations. However, will the steps currently taken be sufficient to take down Moscow before Kyiv falls?

While Western sanctions have crippled the economy, there’s an argument to be made that these actions could lead to a loosening of monetary policy which would mute or reverse many effects. Moreover, while China has called the situation in Ukraine as a war and reiterated their claim that Russia was a “strategic partner” and not an ally, China has stepped in to fill many of the gaps caused by the departure of Western multinational companies and will likely be crucial in ensuring Russia evades the harshest implications of sanctions. Without escalation on this front–either through the intensification of the sanctions themselves or their enforcement–it appears unlikely for the present state to seriously threaten the short-term stability of the Russian government and could even strengthen it.

There are many issues with polling, particularly when dealing with a country such as Russia. With that caveat in mind, a poll conducted by Levada Center before the invasion found 60% of respondents blamed the US and NATO for the escalation in Ukraine while 14% blamed Ukraine (translated). In November, those numbers were 50% and 16% respectively. The same pollster found Putin had a 69% approval, 29% disapproval rating before the invasion, compared to 61% and 37% respectively in August. A poll conducted after the invasion by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (state-run) found 68% of Russians approved of the “special military operation” while 22% opposed it (translated). Another poll by a Russian opposition group found 59% approved of the invasion while 34% opposed it (translated).

Will a Russian population–facing increasing oppression by their regime, human tolls imposed by the war in Ukraine, and economic devastation by Western actions–turn on their regime or the actors they have been predisposed to fault? Especially when actions have led to the global exclusions of Russians.

The answer remains unclear as the Russian media and government integrate the war into their narrative, however we find it likelier than not to help the Russian regime, at least in the short-term. Moreover, much has been made at the anti-war protests. Andrew and I do not discount these as a signal. They are important. The fact that their size appears growing and that they take place under increasingly growing risk cannot be ignored. Over 4,300 people were arrested this past Sunday. But while the New York Times describes them as the largest “single day of protest in recent memory,”  over 5,100 people were arrested on the January 31, 2021, Navalny protests.

Questions & Objectives

As we follow the economic and political war, our key questions are:

1. Will the West increase their sanctions on Russia, including a ban on gas and oil, which would significantly hamper the Russian economy?
2. Will domestic sentiment in Russia start to blame the regime more than others as the war wages on and can the Kremlin contain the fallout?
3. Will the West be able to convince China to join their side in pressuring the Russian government and preventing their evasion of sanctions despite considering the country a threat to the same world order they are now defending?
4. As the cost of sanctions on the West increases, either due to rising wheat, semiconductor, and other commodities prices, will domestic audiences in the West continue supporting extreme sanctions?
5. What role will potential Russian counter-sanctions and cyberattacks play?

We can consider the objectives of the various actors as:

• Ukraine: Inflict rising human costs on Russia.
• The West: Inflict as much economic and political damage as Russia, while limiting the damages they face.
• Russia: Resist domestic collapse.
• China: Avoid publicly picking a side.

Outcomes & Constraints

In summary, the conflict in Ukraine is taking place on two fronts, with each side racing across the finish line:

• Military: Russian forces supported by Belarus are trying to conquer (at least temporarily) Ukraine which is supported by the United States, NATO, and allies.
• Economic / Political: The United States, European Union, and allies are attempting to collapse the Russian government via the economy and isolation (Tarek Mansour, the co-founder of Kalshi, explains this well here).

Which brings us back to the four questions posed at the start. As a reminder, they were:

1. Will an agreement be reached by all parties in the Russo-Ukrainian War before, or shortly after, the fall of Kyiv?
2. Will the Russian government collapse before, or shortly after, Q1 is resolved?
3. How long until Q1 resolves?
4. Which parties will be involved in an agreement ending the Russo-Ukrainian War?

Questions one and two map out the potential outcomes in this stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War, while three and four capture their dimensions.

Row 1 captures the outcomes where Russia is able to capture Kyiv while managing internal struggles and isolation. This would mean that should a peace deal occur in the conflict, that Ukraine and the West would likely be the ones who surrender–although the degree can vary depending on duration (Q3) and parties involved (Q4).

Row 2 captures a multiulde of worlds. Prolonged conflict ranges from a peace treaty signed by a puppet government (which likely leads to continued isolation and economic warfare by the West) to a prolonged war where the Ukrainian government continues its fight from Lviv to an insurgency based in Poland (as discussed by the US and UK governments).

Row 3 captures the outcomes where Ukrainian resistance withheld Russian forces long enough for the West to defeat Russia through its economic and political warfare such that it sued for peace and "lost"–although the degree seems quite varied.

Row 4 captures a very uncertain (or dark) set of worlds where somehow the West's economic warfare worked (perhaps achieved through a coup?) which led to the contiuation of fighting. This can range wildly to a Putin replacement who doubles down to a larger confrontation with China due to the West's attempts to engage them in this conflict.

The goal for Russia is to end up in row 1 or settle for row 2. While for Ukraine and the West it is to end up in row 3 or settle for rows 2 and 4 (the latter is likely preferable). Ideally, we could try to find a middle ground between rows 1 and 3 which are preferable to all sides by reducing the gains / losses for both sides. The questions are, however:

• What are the minimum terms both sides would accept?
• How do those minimum terms change as the conflict continues?

We'll touch on the first point in the next newsletter so get subscribed (it's legit free!). For now we'll focus on the second question.

The Constraints on Peace in the Russo-Ukrainian War

The factors driving the likelihood of a peace deal.

Global GuessingAndrew Eaddy

As the duration of the conflict increases, so too do the costs. As a result of human, economic, and political costs, the gap increases between what the East (Russia, Belarus, probably China) and the West (Ukraine, US, EU, NATO, JP, etc.) will accept. Not only as a result of time, but as Q4 increases in terms of scope (Will Belarus officially enter the military war?) and clarity (China in the economic and political?). The more people involved (which also increases costs), the more interests and constraints need to be accounted for, the further the gap between rows 1 and 3.

Ukraine’s Constraints

• Domestic opinion: Critical for defending nationality. One poll indicates 88% of Ukrainians believe their country will prevail. 76% want to join NATO and 86% the EU; these numbers are up from 54% and 58% in December (when only 12% of respondents appoved of the Minsk-II agreements [translated]).
• The West: Critical for increasing the duration of the conflict (arms, intelligence, aid, economic / political warfare) and securing Ukraine the most beneficial terms possible.
• International support: Important for protecting Western unity.
• Zelensky: Does he stay in the country until the end with Bush levels of approval rating or leave to fight a prolonged conflict? Will he be a dealmaker in a peace deal or a roadblock as he manages domestic opinion.

Russia’s Constraints

• Cost of invasion: Human, economic, political
• Relationship with China
• Domestic opinion
• Battlefield situation

Starting with the last constraint, as Ukraine continues to resist Russia’s military, the conflict will become exceedingly protracted, raising Q3. As this conflict extends, protests in Russia could grow, forcing Russia to fight battles at home and abroad. This will also come at a cost, increasing the key constraint of Russian economic stability. Finally, as all of this takes place, Russia’s relationship with China will also come into focus. China does not want to bail out Russia – it is going through its own domestic economic and political struggles, and only wants to maintain regional stability. They likely also want a diplomatic outcome to this conflict. Will Russia risk angering China by continuing this conflict, creating more instability, and incurring greater costs by the day which China may, at some point, at least partially be on the hook for?

China’s Constraints

For China, there are only three real constraints: regional stability and (ideally) avoiding economic warfare with the West. The tension between these two constraints will be a key focus for us. While China does not want to take a side, their actions and words indicate they are more likely to support Russia than help in their demise.

Western Constraints

And finally, for the West, constraints are unfortunately rampant. Most integral to this discussion, is the West’s willingness to continue supporting Ukraine and risk greater conflict. This constraint is driven by others.

First, with the forthcoming midterm elections in the United States, the French presidential election in April, and other elections in NATO and EU countries, domestic support and politicization of this conflict will be central to decision-making. Leaders will be focusing on pleasing their bases, and if those bases turn from supporting Ukraine, these countries’ willingness to continue support, especially in an inflated global economy, may go down. This may lower the odds of Q1, while raising the results of Q3.

Second, Western interest in supporting Ukraine is also beholden to Western unity and cohesion in decision-making. As we have witnessed, Putin’s actions have ironically begun to strengthen Western unity through multilateral organizations. This cohesion has been key to fighting Russia on the economic and military fronts. This cohesion will need to continue if the West wants to keep supporting Ukraine. This also ties into ideological constraints which the West is facing, and the larger implications for great power politics.

The West has long painted itself as a purveyor of human rights and democracy throughout the world. It has held up a rules based order for states to abide by, and has, at times, used both hard and soft power to enforce this system. The rules based order is an ideologically-driven framework, and relies on winning in the marketplace of ideas to garner support.

So, as we enter this next chapter of great power politics and work to set frameworks and precedents for interaction between nuclear powers in a multi-polar world, clear and consistent ideology will be a constraint to the West’s response. It still has to win the hearts and minds of its own citizens as well as other countries, and cannot look like it is straying too far from the principles it purports to be preserving as it supports Ukraine. Ideology from the West, and the nature of precedent-setting with Russia will be very important constraints to any decision-making that the West engages in.

Forecasts & Predictions

We forecast a 20% likelihood that an agreement will be reached by all parties in the Russo-Ukrainian War before, or shortly after, the fall of Kyiv.

The impact of economic sanctions from the West, and growing domestic dissent in Russia are both growing constraints on the country’s military Ukraine in Russia. With China as a backstop, and Putin having deep expertise in quelling domestic upstarts, however, the impact of these constraints is not prohibitive…yet. Moreover, given the chasm between what all parties would accept from a peace deal given other constraints, we give the odds of a peace deal at 20% for now, with a range of [10%, 33%].

We forecast an 8% likelihood the Russian government collapses before, or shortly after, the above question is resolved.

Russia’s economic ailing, upset oligarchs, and domestic squabbles are all pressures on the preservation of Russia’s government. But Russia does have allies (for now) including a very powerful ally in China. The regime has also withstood pressure from both the international community and from within before. Collapsing a government with the history and the size of Russia is not an easy task, and so while we might be on the road to government weakening, our current forecast is 8%, with a range of [5%, 12%].

• 03/10/22: 📉 6% (-2) [5% (+0), 8% (-4)]

We predict it will take three months for the first question forecasted will be resolved.

Given the plodding pace of Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, and the endless faucet of aid streaming in from countries in NATO and the EU, this conflict seems destined for a protracted timeline. Add Zelensky’s role in Ukrainian sentiment to keep fighting, and Russia showing no signs of giving up, three months seems like a reasonable timeline before either further escalation or an agreement. Although Metaculus gives the odds of Kyiv falling by April at 32% and 45% by June, so we may be off here and we are undercounting the risk of Russian governmental collapse. Conversely, forecasters could be discounting the potential for a collapse in Ukrainian resistance as cities fall and stay occupied. We would put our range at [1mo, 5mo].

We predict the following countries will take part in the agreement mentioned in the first question forecasted: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, United States, European Union, NATO, and China.

Given the implicated parties to date, it makes sense that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the EU, NATO, and (likely) China will need to agree to a peace deal. They may not all be signatories, but will have a hand in the terms of any deal to be struck between these countries or need to participate in the de-escalation of tensions (e.g., reducing / removing sanctions).

Crowd Forecasts & Resources

Forecasting Resources for the Russo-Ukrainian War: Crowd Forecasts, Newsletters, Information Sources

Crowd forecasts, expert / superforecaster predictions, and useful resources about the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Global GuessingClay Graubard

Escalation & Implications

Yesterday, I wrote on Twitter that I was in disbelief by how casually the West has climbed the escalation ladder. I was not (and am not) arguing that Western actions have been wrong. I am inclined to agree with Andrew, that such actions were necessary due to how events shape larger themes.

But this sidesteps the larger point I was trying to make. A war is being waged in Europe. One side is a nuclear-armed former superpower, and both sides have shown they will go to war in pursuit of their objectives. The United States said they would not go to war. NATO and the UK too. Now let's examine a brief timeline of escalation.

Instead of going to war, we outlined a package of potential sanctions...and then immediately did more than expected, with a few cherries on top.

The initial SWIFT sanctions on Russia included work-arounds, in part to allow countries to purchase Russian energy. 12 days later?

U.S., European allies discuss banning imports of Russian oil

The United States and European allies are exploring banning imports of Russian oil, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Sunday, and the White House coordinated with key Congressional committees moving forward with their own ban.

ReutersHumeyra Pamuk

Already US lawmakers have taken steps to move forward the idea. For now, German Chancellor Scholz has rejected the idea, but throughout this crisis we’ve rejected ideas and made a complete-180 a few days later. Will this be different? Or could it reveal cracks in the West's unity?

On March 1, 2022, Poland and other countries announced they would not send Ukraine fighter jets for fear of escalation:

Polish President Andrzej Duda joined the chorus on Tuesday. Speaking alongside NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at the Łask Air Base in Poland, Duda said his country is “not going to send any jets to the Ukrainian airspace,” arguing “that would open a military interference in the Ukrainian conflict.”

March 6?

U.S., Poland Look at Providing Soviet-Era Aircraft to Ukraine

The U.S. is exploring a deal in which Poland would send Soviet-era aircraft to Ukraine in return for American F-16 jet fighters, U.S. officials said. Poland’s prime minister’s office dismissed reports of a potential arrangement.

The Wall Street JournalNancy A. Youssef, Siobhan Hughes and Lindsay Wise

• The US continues to explore more sanction options, and have threatened China should they help Russia evade the current regime.
• Ukraine’s foreign minister said more than 20,000 foreign volunteers have signed up to fight in Ukraine including Americans (what happens if they die in large numbers such that it is politically infeasible to ignore?).
• The US and UK governments are already planning for a long insurgency and the possibility of a Ukrainian government-in-exile.

All of this–and more!–by day 12 in a conflict which could last months or years.

Consider these three questions:

1. What happens if the steps we’ve taken so far constitute a red line for Russia down the line that currently do not? Do we stop then, or live with the consequences?
2. What happens if the current economic sanctions are not sufficient to collapse the Russian economy and government? Do we increase the sanctions further, find a way to co-opt China into the scheme, and shoulder the costs as inflation continues to rise?
3. Should NATO eventually send the jets, what happens when the 70-or-so MiG and Su aircraft they have run out? I assume we first try to find more, but then what? Do we fly planes for the Ukrainians, like the Soviet Union did in the Korean War for the North? In that war, American and Soviet pilots shot and killed one another. It didn’t lead to war then. But if our desired outcome is to collapse the Russian government (which is either our explicit or implicit goal by shaping the terms of a potential peace deal), will the past repeat itself here? Or do we train and base Ukrainian pilots out of Poland? What happens if Russia attacks those airfields, since they’ve already called that participation in the conflict? Do we go to war? Shrug off the losses and keep supporting Ukraine? Or maybe when we run out of fighter jets do we just give up on Ukraine and thereby practically force their surrender? Would Ukraine even give in then? After rising costs on Russia and then bailing on Ukraine, would we expect a peace deal to be more favorable to Ukraine than in the world prior? What would that say about the Liberal International Order?

Every action we in the West take in response to the war has impacts on all four questions we mentioned at the top. My point is–our point is–we are not seriously considering the actions we are taking. And we aren't considering the degree to which the other actors involved are willing to climb the escalation ladder.

Andrew agrees that it is critically important to think through the cost-benefit calculus of engaging in sanctions warfare with Russia. Especially as it pertains to the human cost of suffering in Ukraine and Russia, as well as at home. He also believes that clear and resolute communication from the United States and the West on its stance towards Russia’s aggressive moves in Ukraine is paramount. Similarly to the West’s expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, this sanctions response sends an ambivalent message to Russia and other potential annexors around the world; there has not been a clear message that Russia can or cannot have Ukraine. As touched on above, decisions made today will have significant impacts on how nuclear powers interact moving forward, and I do not envy leaders debating how to extend a rules based order in a multi-polar world still dictated by many realist principles. But these are the questions we are faced with, and so in my opinion any decision made should be with Ukraine in mind, yes, but also the future of the world order. And any decision with that much weight attached to it must be consistent, resolute, and loud.

So when we take steps, we have to ask what are the associated costs? Risks? How do our actions shape the potential futures that currently exist? Do they do so in a way which reflects our desired outcomes relative to our risk and cost tolerances? What are our desired outcomes and how do they relate to the desires and constraints of others?

TL/DR: My issue is that there are too few signs we are grappling with these questions when taking actions.

We are standing up for democracy, protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, and crushing an evil regime run by a fascist dictator. Emotion and ideology should not guide our response. They are (to some signfiicant degree), but they should definetly not. Which is dangerous, especially when the goal of one side (i.e., Ukraine) wants to get us directly involved.

It's especially dangerous when "we" find ourselves glued to a late-night YouTube live stream, watching a drone capture a Russian attack on the largest nuclear plant in Europe, while at the same time the Ukrainian foreign minister tweets about an ongoing fire which could lead to an explosion 7-10X the size of Chernobyl and that's why we need a no fly zone right now and miss the Twitter threads pointing out why a meltdown would be nothing like Chernobyl in terms of scale...before the live stream ends minutes before firefighters were allowed on the scene.

Before we conclude, two more points.

The first is that we should seriously think through our responses to potential (eventual?) retaliatory actions from Russia now. As the pressure increases on the regime, as we increase the probability of Q2, this becomes ever more important. How will we respond to:

1. Above ground nuclear weapons tests?
2. Atmospheric nuclear weapons tests?
3. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine?
4. The use of strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine?

Whatever we decide should be the response is the one we stick to. With this risk, we can't pull a SWIFT one on them.

The second is that, if our goal is to take down the Russian regime, we should probably be very honest about the seriousness of the task and acknowledge the risks and costs associated. I'm not opposed to the idea. A lot of short-term risks for the potential of a lot fewer future ones. It's not a bad tradeoff in theory.

Afterword

On December 22, 2021, I forecasted a 72% likelihood Russia would invade Ukraine in 2022. Sixty-one days later, on February 21, 2022, at 13:00 GMT, I had seen enough. (Forecast stats here.)

But on April 19, 2021, when Russia was amassing troops and equipment on Ukraine's border, Andrew and I forecasted a 51% likelihood of renewed conflict in the Donbas before October. At the time, the Metaculus community was 42%. We grappled with whether the build up was indicative of conflict or other objectives. On balance, we gave slight odds to the former due to the mixed opinions of our expert follows and the base-rate.

Three days later, Russia announced a withdrawal of its troops–something they followed through on, despite leaving substantial amounts of equipment behind.  We lowered our forecast to 15% (community: 41%), before adjusting slightly again on the 27th to 20% (35%). We made our final update on June 21, 2021, to 16% (20%).

But in 2022, the signals never changed:

1. The odds of Putin bluffing rather than issuing ultimatums on NATO / EU membership for Ukraine, including a neutral or pro-Kremlin orientation and security concessions in Europe to boot, were small and diminishing;
2. The odds of the US providing Russia with legally binding guarantees on Ukrainian NATO membership (also likely Moldova and Georgia) and seriously grappling and addressing Russian security demands were small and diminishing;
3. The odds of the US and NATO directly involving themselves in the conflict were small and diminishing, with the odds for sanction severity indicating the present regime was unexpected;
4. The odds of Xi intervening were miniscule.

On the morning of February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.

Understanding how we got to today is critical in finding the best way out. We'll dive into this story more over the coming newsletters as we update our forecasts and understand the potential worlds we can achieve.

All recorded forecasts are updated weekly. Get the latest signals on the conflict by following @WarSignals on Twitter.

Newsletters

The Constraints on Peace in the Russo-Ukrainian War

The factors driving the likelihood of a peace deal.

Global GuessingAndrew Eaddy

Don’t Ignore the Consequences of Great Power Conflict

12 days into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we begin forecasting.

Global GuessingClay Graubard

Political Forecasts

End of Conflict

Will Zelensky stay in power?

Will Putin stay in power?

Other

Military Forecasts

Russia-NATO

• Will there be more than 4 deaths between Russia and NATO forces outside of Ukraine before July 1, 2023? Metaculus
• Will NATO declare a No-Fly Zone anywhere in Ukraine before 2023? Metaculus
• Will any NATO member country invoke Article 5 by June 30, 2022? Polymarket
• Will any NATO country invoke Article 5 by December 31, 2022? Metaculus
• In 2022, will NATO invoke its Article 5 on collective defense? Hypermind
• Between 4 February 2022 and 31 December 2022, will a country formally progress in the NATO accession process? GJ Open
• Between 11 February 2022 and 31 December 2022, will a country formally progress in the NATO accession process? GJI
• Will NATO expand in 2022? Polymarket

Will Russia recognize 🇲🇩 Transnistria?

Will Russia invade elsewhere?

• Before January 1, 2023, will Russia invade or annex all or part of Belarus? (Metaculus)
• Will Russian troops invade Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia prior to 2024? (Metaculus)
• Will Russia invade any country other than Ukraine in 2022? (Metaculus)
• Will Russia annex Transnistria in 2022? (Metaculus)

WMDs / Nuclear Weapons

• Before 5 August 2022, will Russia detonate a nuclear device outside of Russian territory or airspace? GJ Open
• Will a nuclear weapon be launched in combat in 2022? Manifold
• In 2022, will a nuclear weapon be used to kill? Hypermind
• Will an offensive nuclear detonation cause at least 1 fatality before 2024? Metaculus (note, there is limited access on who can view this question)
• Will the United States accuse Russia of having used chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine before July? (Hypermind)

War Deaths

Economic Forecasts

Russian Sanctions and Economy

Russian Cyberwarfare

33%: Will critical US infrastructure be successfully attacked by Russian cyberattacks before 2023? (Metaculus)

US Markets and Inflation

Global Markets and Inflation

Twitter Lists

• Main: Russo-Ukrainian War by Clay Graubard
• Additional: Russia-Ukraine by Clay Graubard
• OSINT: Russia-Ukraine by Clay Graubrd
• Establishment: Russia-Ukraine by Clay Graubard
• By AviG: Ukraine Russia OSINT
• By Noahpinion: Ukraine-Russia Journalists
• By Kevin Rothrock: Anglophone Russia
• By Kevin Rothrock: Reporting from Ukraine
• By Tier10K: Mostly Ukraine OSINT
• By Naval: War
• By Bob Gourley: Russia Ukraine 2022

Have a good Twitter list? Reach out to us on Twitter!

Curated Signals @WarSignals

Resolved: Will Russia invade Ukraine?

This information can now be find on here.

Will Russia Invade Ukraine in 2022?

Historical crowd forecasts and resources on whether Russia would invade Ukraine.

Global GuessingClay Graubard

Show Notes

• 00:00 - Intro & Tom's Background and Focus
• 11:22 - The Nuance Problem in Mainstream Media
• 19:15 - Forecasting and Prediction Markets in News Media
• 33:30 - Numeracy and Statistical Literacy Issues
• 44:11 - Tom's Information Diet & Outro

A Conversation on Forecasting with Tom Chivers

In this podcast episode, we sat down with Tom Chivers—author, journalist, and science writer for The i—to have a conversation on forecasting and the news media. We talked about his background in the media industry, his frustrations with mainstream news and its lack of nuance, his views on forecasting and prediction markets in media, and more.

Tom previously wrote for BuzzFeed UK, served as the science editor for UnHerd, and has bylines with New York Times, Guardian, New Scientist, and The Telegraph. He often writes data-driven rebuttals to topics that are being primarily depicted in one way in the media, interjecting nuance into the conversations. In many ways, the same exercise as distinguishing signals from noise. Conducting journalism with a forecaster’s mindset.

He's also written two books, The AI Does Not Hate You in 2019 and How to Read Numbers in 2021, and writes about similar topics discussed in our communities, including effective altruism, rationality, and forecasting. To our knowledge, Tom is one of the most prominent journalists writing about and covering quantified forecasts. In June of last year, Tom assembled a panel of superforecasters for an article on whether China will invade Taiwan and has started to make his own predictions too!

You can follow Tom on Twitter: @TomChivers.

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You can also listen to this podcast on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Podbean, YouTube, or your platform of choice (instructions at the end of the article).

Almost two weeks ago the world became aware of a new troubling variant of the SARS-CoV-2 which we now call Omicron. Immediately, the new variant raised all sorts of red flags within the scientific community and caused reverberations in public policy and markets. However, the information we had was growing but limited, making it difficult to say how Omicron would change the pandemic.

How should we understand Omicron relative to Delta? How does Omicron change the nature of the pandemic and what steps should we be taking in response? These questions require navigating and quantifying uncertainty, while also making forecasts about the future. We could think of no one better than Juan Cambeiro for answers.

Juan Cambeiro is a Global Guessing alum, Good Judgment superforecaster, and Metaculus analyst, who placed first in IARPA's FOCUS Tournament on COVID-19 forecasting and was the former first-place COVID forecaster on Good Judgment Open.

Juan recently wrote a fantastic article on Metaculus about the Omicron variant–providing a concise analysis of the variant from an epidemiological and public health perspective, while also offering five concrete forecasts about it:

1. When will Omicron become the predominant SARS-CoV-2 variant in the U.S.?
2. Will the US, UK, or EU authorize an Omicron-specific booster before 2023?
3. What will be the R0 of the Omicron variant according to the mean estimate of the first relevant systematic review?
4. Will the Omicron variant be more lethal than Delta?
5. Will the Omicron variant be less lethal than Delta?

You can find the Metaculus community forecasts for these questions at the end.

In this podcast, we'll talk to Juan about how he analyzed and understood the variant, chose and forecasted these five questions, and key signals he’s identified and looking out for in the future. We'll also chat about how policymakers and others should respond to the variant and understand the information from these forecasts. At the end, we'll discuss additional forecasting questions we should be asking to better understand the variant's impact on the pandemic.

Note: This podcast was recorded on December 6, 2021.

Helpful Resources

Omicron: What We Know, What To Expect, & What To Do

Metaculus is a community dedicated to generating accurate predictions about future real-world events by aggregating the collective wisdom, insight, and intelligence of its participants.

MetaculusCreated by juancambeiro on {{qctrl.question.created_time | dateStr}}.

Metaculus Forecasts

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It's hard to imagine, but 51 weeks ago we launched Global Guessing with our inaugural forecast on the 2020 Burkina Faso Presidential Election. In the time since, we've released:

• 4 Election Forecasts;
• 18 Volumes of Metaculus Mondays, covering some 30 questions;
• 20 (+ 1 interview) episodes of the Global Guessing Weekly Podcast;
• 6 episodes of ✅ The Right Side of Maybe podcast;
• 13 episodes of our live joint-podcast with AR Global Security, This Week in Geopolitics; and
• 3 issues of the real-money prediction market newsletter 💰 Crowd Money and two episodes of the Crowd Money Cast.

In today's final (???) episode of the Weekly Podcast, we wanted to go over this incredible past year–discussing why we started this project, recount the content we've produced, highlight our favorite moments, and discuss how our thoughts about quantified forecasting and the content we produce evolved since that Burkinabe forecast.

While this may be the final GGWP for a while, we're not going anywhere! At the end of this episode, we'll share with you our exciting Global Guessing plans for 2022 and beyond with respect to forecasts and podcasts.

Thank you so much for being with us for the last year and the support you have shown. We hope you enjoy the show!

— Andrew and Clay

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Show Notes

00:00-01:40 | Introduction

01:41-12:30 | David's Background
David talks on a high-level about the work and research he has done over the past few years, and expands upon how he sees it developing in the years ahead. What role has forecasting played? Pandemic preparedness and vaccine challenge trials

12:31-49:25 | Vaccine Development, Pandemic Preparedness, Challenge Trials
What is the likelihood that countries develop and invest the necessary resources over the next few years to develop safe and effective vaccines within 100 days? What are human challenge trials and why are the beneficial? What is the best-faith argument against them?

49:26-57:44 | Forecasting in Government
In an ideal world, what would forecasting adoption in government look like? What is the current reality? And how we can improve the situation?

57:45-1:06:37 | Rapid Fire Forecasts + Outro

And we're back! Welcome everyone to the eighteenth episode of the Global Guessing Weekly Podcast, the podcast on all things geopolitics and forecasting. Today we are joined by GG alum David Manheim, lead researcher for the human challenge trial advocacy group 1DaySooner who previously appeared on The Right Side of Maybe to discuss his accuracy in forecasting Covid vaccines.

David received a PhD in Public Policy from Pardee Rand Graduate School focusing on risk analysis and decision theory. He has done work on a variety of grants and contracts to research existential risk mitigation, public health, computational modelling, and infectious disease epidemiology for organizations such as the RAND Corporation. In addition to his work with 1DaySooner, David currently works with the Foresight Institute, is a Superforecaster with Good Judgement Inc., and recently became a visiting professor at the Israel Institute of Technology "working to build interdisciplinary collaborations with technical researchers on the promises and risks of emerging technologies."

In this episode, you'll hear David talk about his work in biosecurity including the recent report he worked on for the Council on Strategic Risks, a US think tank, and his work with 1DaySooner on human challenge trials to learn how this change in vaccine testing could save millions of lives. We also chatted with David about the role that quantified forecasting currently plays in government policy and discuss why the technique is under-utilized. Finally, we get David’s thoughts on real-money prediction markets and the importance of question-quality in both prediction markets and platforms.

Note: This episode was recorded on July 29th.

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We’ve now forecasted five times whether the US will return to the JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal) by the end of 2021. In this week’s volume of Metaculus Mondays we want to do a different kind of forecast—one designed to make us rethink and question our current assumptions. So instead of updating for the sixth time, we are going to make a new forecast explaining a discrete, theoretical world where we very much got this question wrong—and there is no blaming the #fattails.

Far from the world that gives a meager 30% chance, this is the world where the best forecast would give an 80% likelihood the US returns to the JCPOA by the end of the year.

But before we get started, in case you missed it, we published two great podcast interviews last week.

• Want to learn from a top Metaculus and Good Judgement COVID Forecaster? The Right Side of Maybe with Juan Cambeiro (transcript available)
• Interested in listening to a former Australian diplomat and co-founder of a new geopolitical media company? Global Guessing Weekly Podcast with John Fowler

Our Original Case

On February 15, 2021 in the second volume of Metaculus Mondays, we gave a 20% likelihood that the United States either lifts or waives sanctions on Iran greater or equal to those mandated under the original JCPOA or negotiates a new deal with Iran containing sanctions relief. At the time, the community median forecast on Metaculus was 55%; on Good Judgement Open it was 80%.

Our original forecast was primarily based on the following factors:

1. Given the time it took to negotiate the original JCPOA (2 years) and the time it took Trump to pull out of the JCPOA (18 months), we found it highly unlikely ( < 5%) a new deal would be negotiated by the end of the year — Result: Only worth focusing on whether the Biden Administration would lift or waive sanctions on Iran.
2. We next looked at the constraints on both Iranian and United States decision-makers. On the highest level, these were well telegraphed. For Iran: The US lifts all sanctions unilaterally. For the US: Iran returns to the terms under the original JCPOA unilaterally.
3. After highlighting these first-order constraints, we looked at three second-level constraints that could dictate the outcome:

• Political: What can Biden and Rouhani accomplish before the June elections? How might the election outcome affect the chances? What can Biden reasonably accomplish unilaterally?
• Time: How long would it take to rejoin should both sides agree to a return to the deal?
• Geopolitical: How have Iran’s geopolitical priorities and positioning within the Middle East changed since 2015 and how might that affect a return to the deal?

Metaculus Mondays: US Rejoins Iran Nuclear Deal? + Number of Major Wars in 2020s

In the second volume of Metaculus Mondays, we forecast the likelihood the United States rejoins the Iran Nuclear Deal, plus the likelihood of major war and a prediction update on COVID variants.

Global GuessingAndrew Eaddy

Pre-Mortem Forecast

Given all of this, now might seem like an odd time to make a pre-mortem forecast about a world where we are off on this forecast. Since our original forecast, a lot of the constraints we identified came into play—and at the same time, we’ve seen both the Metaculus and especially the GJOpen communities approach our forecast (which we’ve actually increased over time) rather than increase upwards.

Yes, for months diplomats have been saying “we’re almost there with a deal” before following up with a “but, actually, just FYI...a lot of difficult points still need to be addressed”, and yes, hard-liner Raisi won in the recent Iranian “elections”. However, we feel it is precisely because of these developments that it is best to take a hard look and see if we’ve missed any big pieces.

Point: Hardliners in Iran have complete control of the government. Their recent election was likely influenced in their favor, and Raisi has been reported as Khomeini’s successor putting him in a very strong domestic political position, allowing him to act unilaterally and get an early win in his global political career.

• Counterpoint: Raisi doesn’t need a political win given his strong position, making a deal with the United States an unnecessary political risk.

Point: China has shown an interest in working with Iran in recent times. This is likely due to the strong economic and geopolitical potential of Iran, as well as its adversarial orientation towards the United  States. It is possible that lifting sanctions would more quickly allow Iran to pivot towards China and later Russia.

• Counterpoint: Alternatively, Chinese interest in partnering with Iran may encourage a scorched earth approach to diplomacy from Iran, leaving the United States negotiations entirely.

Point: Iran is in a very strong regional position in the Middle East right now: they beat Saudi Arabia in Yemen and have engaged diplomatically with the Saudi kingdom recently; they drummed up anti-Israeli sentiment in the US with the recent Gaza-Israel war; they’ve held talks with Iraq and conducted clear signs of statecraft. The economic boost from sanctions relief could help make these geopolitical wins, long-term sustainable.

• Counterpoint: Iran has been able to accomplish all of this under United States sanctions, perhaps giving up long-term nuclear potential could limit the country from leveraging its improved geopolitical position. Perhaps its geopolitical wins of late are predicated on a long-term vision of Iran that is nuclear.

Point: The short-term economic benefits of lifting sanctions would likely outweigh the short-term benefits of a nuclear weapon for Iran; the Iranian situation is different from North Korea’s.

• Counterpoint: However, short-term gains may result in long-term vulnerabilities for Iran’s position in the Middle East from a security perspective.

Point: Biden wants a foreign policy achievement that stands out from the Trump administration, and is committed to getting the deal done regardless of long-term benefits.

• Counterpoint: Examining this point through a Papic-ian lens, Biden’s preferences may not outweigh his ability to work with congress, Iran, and the other negotiating parties to get a deal across the line in time.

Blending the Forecasts

So how do we blend our current JCPOA forecast with our pre-mortem on this question?

We are currently at 30% on this forecast and we initially planned to drop our forecast to 20%. We feel, however, that the lack of material changes in the situation on the ground regarding JCPOA negotiations, and the impact of our pre-mortem are not significant enough to warrant a 10% drop.

Instead, we are dropping our forecast for this question to 25% and will continue to evaluate developments on this issue.

Ultimately, the effect of this forecast vis a vis our pre-mortem is that we are lowering our forecast at a slower rate than we otherwise would have. We also want to be on the lookout for any signals that would indicate this alternative forecast is the correct one (or more of a correct forecast than we are currently saying).

What would those signals look like?

• New signs of Iranian economic vulnerability that would require a stable solution such as Iranian-United States diplomacy as opposed to illicit financing from a ‘revisionist’ power.
• Signals from Raisi that he is genuinely interested in working with the United States to support Iran’s revival, as not as a political victory
• Either Iran or the United States lowering their bar for cooperation

What would signals look like indicating this new forecast is less correct than we are currently saying?

• China or Russia making a strong financial commitment to supporting Iran which would preclude the need for United States sanction relief
• More time passing without material updates on the JCPOA negotiation process
• Joe Biden’s domestic political positioning requiring a political win i.e. playing a tough hand with Iran

If there are other signals that we should be mindful of, be sure to comment below or reach out to us on Twitter!

COVID Origins Update

Finally, we want to conclude this volume by updating our Covid origins forecast due to a similar rethinking process. Although there have not been any material changes since our last update, we have decided to lower our overall Covid origins forecast from 82% to 71.4%. This does not change our current Metaculus forecast, however, due to us also decreasing the political discount factor in our prediction (50% -> 75%). While we actually have little remaining confidence that political considerations will prevent a declaration of lab-related origins should the relevant health agencies reach that conclusion, we still want to discount our overall forecast to account for the limited time before resolution.

So why the decrease? Because Zeynep’s recent post made us rethink our overall confidence in our forecast. As she reminds us, with the exception of during the initial months of the pandemic there has been an information drought due to an active cover-up by the Chinese government. The result, she says, is that “going forward, we should consider all possibilities as potential pathways and think about what can be done. I people don’t [sic] understand the evidentiary basis on which people are assigning precise(ish) likelihoods to the paths leading to a rare, perhaps once-in-a-century rare, event when a lot of paths have been demonstrated as viable.”

Forecasting the Origins of Covid-19 and Chances for Yemeni Peace in 2021

Likelihood of Zoonotic vs Lab-based origin, plus forecasting the chances of a ceasefire or peace deal in Yemen by 2022.

Global GuessingAndrew Eaddy

While we disagree with the notion of assigning precise likelihoods (it’s kind of our schtick), we now believe our previous 1-in-5 likelihood for non-lab origins was too bearish given the circumstances. As a result, we reduced our forecast by ~15% and remain unconvinced a lab-related explanation is 50-50 or sub-50% likelihood given the signals currently driving our forecast.

As news around this question is constantly changing and evolving, we will be keeping a close eye on new developments. As far as the impact of the questions which we forecast go, this one ranks among the highest, and as such deserves both ample attention and a critical eye.

Career paths rarely unfold linearly, and this week's guest is no exception. But his winding way in geopolitics (as he discusses) provided him with exceptional perspective which has surely informed his geopolitical chops.

Welcome to the 17th episode of the Global Guessing Weekly Podcast. This week, we are joined by John Fowler of the rapidly growing media franchise Intrigue Media.

Hailing from Australia, John’s path to where he is today has been anything but standard. John began his career as a lawyer after graduating university, working with the department of foreign affairs and trade. But after admittedly becoming disillusioned with that path, he leveraged his legal learnings as a diplomat for the Australian Foreign Service working on maritime law. His career has taken him all over the world, from Australia to China, and now John has pivoted again, having just finished his MBA in London.

John’s experiences have given him an incredible perspective on all things geopolitics and global affairs, and this has culminated, somewhat recently in the launch of his Substack newsletter International Intrigue which he co-founded with Helen Zhang.

During the episode, we talked to John about his circuitous route to International Intrigue, including stops to study law, join the Australian foreign service, and earn an MBA. We also chatted about some of his most memorable International Intrigue editions as well as exploring the many linkages between the worlds of geopolitics and forecasting. Be sure to listen or watch this episode for some interesting conversation, and to discover another great content hub to consume.

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Every forecaster has wanted to know what the most important factor for improving forecasting accuracy is, but for a long time the answer was not clear. Thanks to a chance overlap of co-authors Ville Satopää and Marat Salikhov at INSEAD, however, a new paper was published alongside forecasting pioneers Philip Tetlock and Barbara Mellers that does a great job of providing a solution.

Their paper, “Bias, Information, Noise: The BIN Model of Forecasting,” deconstructs the forecasting process into its component parts of:

• Information: The inputs you use to move your forecast away from the base rate;
• Bias: Systematic error across a number of forecasts from a single forecaster; and
• Noise: Non-information that is registered as information in a forecast).

From there they test which of these parts is most critical to the accuracy of a forecast, and posit methods to improve in these areas.

In this episode we are lucky enough to sit down with Ville and Marat to discuss the origins of this paper and their follow up one on Crowd Aggregators, their findings from both papers, and the implications for the future of forecasting. We talk about possible avenues for further research based on the exciting results from Ville and Marat’s research, and even speculate on potential applications of the research in new and interesting environments.

We are both big fans of this paper and its authors, and we found the conversation with Ville and Marat extremely rich! Be sure to tune in to this episode, and then go read their paper and let us (and them) know what you think.

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A month away from your forecasts leaves a lot to update.

How does the victory of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi in Iran’s presidential election impact the likelihood the United States returns to the Iran Nuclear Deal by 2022? New Forecast: 30% likelihood.

What does the Putin-Biden Summit reveal about the future of the Russo-Ukrainian War? Old Forecast: 6% likelihood Putin annexes Ukrainian territory by 2022.

Will the ousting of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after twelve years in power affect whether the ceasefire between Israel and Gaza falls apart before 2022? Sort of, but other factors are also in play.

I’ll update our relevant forecasts from past volumes of Metaculus Mondays and examine what the community over at Metaculus is saying to answer these questions and more. I’ll also update our past forecasts on whether North Korea tests an ICBM before 2022, China closes the concentration camps in Xinjiang before 2022, and there is peace in the Yemen Civil War this year. New Forecast: 25% likelihood you read all the updated forecasts.

Volume 17 Summary

Iran Nuclear Deal

Last week, the people of Iran selected Ebrahim Raisi, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Iran, as their next president. Raisi, a hardliner with close ties to the Ayatollah (who’s consolidation of power continues), is currently under sanctions by the US for alleged human rights violations. While Raisi is expected to pivot the country towards Russia and China, he is open to accepting re-imposed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, however, as the Ayatollah approves the move if it unshackles Iran’s economy from the weight of US sanctions.

Raisi’s election appears to have created a “do-or-die” moment for the United States, Europe, and the other countries involved in curbing Iran’s nuclear program, however the UN’s nuclear chief says a new deal must wait for the Raisi Administration.

Forecast

Will the US rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal before 2022? | Updated Forecast: 30% 📉-3 (Metaculus Community Median: 45%)

Our Take: It remains unlikelier than not a deal is reached by the end of the year given the time and domestic political restraints. Nevertheless, given Iran’s growing regional strength and geopolitical victories, Raisi might find it wise to (likely temporarily) rejoin the nuclear deal in exchange for the short- and medium-term economic benefits such a move is highly likely to provide.

Negative Signals

Nuclear deal must await new Iran gov't -IAEA chief tells paper | Reuters 6/16/21

Ebrahim Raisi wins a rigged election in Iran. What next? | The Economist 6/19/21

U.S. wants nuclear deal done before Iran's new president takes power | Axios 6/18/21

Mixed Signals

Who Is Ebrahim Raisi? Hard-Line Judge Wins Iran’s 2021 Presidential Election | The Wall Street Journal 6/19/21

Positive Signals

Iran says nuclear talks closer to deal, Russia says much work remains | Reuters 6/17/21

Iran nuclear deal still possible after hardliner's election, EU says | Reuters 6/20/21

North Korea

Since our last update of this forecast, little has changed or emerged from news reports. As a result, one of the biggest drivers behind the updated forecast is the passage of time with just over 6 months left for North Korea to test an ICBM. At the same time, Chairman Kim’s comments during the current party plenum have indicated a more open stance towards dialogue with the United States. Still, as analysts at 38 North have highlighted, Biden needs to engage with North Korea in order to prevent backsliding in US-DPRK relations which would be likely to trigger an ICBM or nuclear test.

Forecast

Will North Korea launch another intercontinental ballistic missile before 2022? | Updated Forecast: 20% 📉-11 (Metaculus: 55%) Good Judgement Open: 22%

Our Take: It is increasingly unlikelier than not that Kim will test an ICBM this year; however, it would also not be surprising for a test to occur.

Mixed Signals

Note to President Biden: Talk to Kim Jong Un | 38 North 6/15/21

Negative Signals

Kim Carefully Nudges the Dialogue Door Open Wider | 38 North 6/18/21

Updated Forecast: 40% likelihood you read all the updated forecasts.

Russo-Ukrainian War

Last week, Biden and Putin held a summit in Geneva under the backdrop of the recent G7 meeting, Russian troop buildup in the Donbass region, and the imprisonment of dissident Alexei Navalny. Despite few accomplishments achieved during the summit, we did discover two key signals that will help us forecast how the Russo-Ukrainian War unfolds throughout the rest of the year.

Firstly, as I discussed during last week’s This Week in Geopolitics Podcast episode with AR Global Security, what was notable during the summit was the lack of grandstanding or illusionary aspirations by the US. In many ways, the summit indicated a cold realism about the relationship between the two states. Another notable development last week were the repeated statements downplaying a Ukranian entry into NATO by both President Biden and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. The net result of these two signals is an increased likelihood of Russian aggression against Ukraine by the end of this year.

However, these signals need to be balanced by a key constraint: Winter weather. This time-based constraint leads to an overall result that lowers the risk of intense fighting.

Forecast

Will Russia annex Ukrainian territory before 2022? | Updated Forecast: 8% 📈+2 (Metaculus: 10%)

Will there be a renewal of intense fighting in the Donbass this summer? | Updated Forecast: 16% 📉-4 (Metaculus: 20%)

Our Take: While Russian aggression against Ukraine remains unlikely for this year, we still increased the forecast on territory annexation because it was too low originally relative to the intense fighting forecast.

Negative Signals

Biden says it 'remains to be seen' whether Ukraine will be admitted to NATO | NBC News 6/14/21

‘We need more’ before Ukraine can join NATO, says Stoltenberg | Defense News 6/15/21

Israel - Palestine Conflict

The situation between Israel and Palestine (and more specifically, Israel and Gaza) remains complicated to parse. Although you will see an upward tick to most of our forecasts, it is somewhat likely that these changes will be reversed.

As of right now, the situation seems very unclear. On one hand, the ceasefire is a very fragile one. In the history of Israel-Hamas ceasefires post-significant violence, most have held fairly well for months after their implementation. This has not been the case in 2021, with at least 24 incendiary balloons being fired at Israel from Gaza (we are not sure whether or not these should count for positive resolution with respect to # of rockets, mortars, and missiles fired at Israel; however, I am counting them for now). Moreover, both Israel and Gaza have talked tough to one another, taking seemingly hardline stances. At the same time, the domestic political situation is also fragile. Benjamin Netanyahu has gone from Prime Minister to (vocal) opposition leader, while Bennet has ascended to power under a broad, new, and slim coalition and is faced with a new hardline president in Iran while the US is also trying to return to the Iran Nuclear Deal.

Nevertheless, there have been some positive signals such as the de-escalation after the fire balloon attacks and subsequent Israeli response, as well as the easing of restrictions in Gaza by Israel.

Forecasts

Will more than 400 Palestinians in 2021 be killed in the Israel-Palestinian conflict? | Updated: 38% Likelihood 📈+5 (Metaculus: 40%)
Will more than 1,000? | Updated: 20% 📈+2 (Metaculus: 18%)
Will more than 2,500? | Updated: 12% 📈+2 (Metaculus: 8%)
Will more than 10,000? | Updated: 3% ⚖️+/- (Metaculus: 4%)

Will more than 4,500 explosives be fired at Israel in 2021? | Updated: 92% 📉-2 (Metaculus: 63%)
Will more than 10,000? | Updated: 43% 📈+10 (Metaculus: 17%)

Our Take: Our original forecast for 4,500 explosives was too high, while we feel our other forecasts were too low. As a result, many of the increases seem larger than they are in response to the news. This will likely remain our most-updated forecast given the complexity of the situation and the seeming difficulty there is in defining the Israel-Gaza conflict trajectory.

• You can follow live forecast updates for these questions here.

Positive Signals

Israel allows export of goods from Gaza, partially reopens Kerem Shalom | The Jerusalem Post 6/20/21

Israel and Hamas Scale Down the Conflict, Avoiding Another War | The New York Times | 6/16/21

Negative Signals

Hamas's Sinwar to Israel: Transfer $30m from Qatar or face escalation | The Jerusalem Post 6/21/21

IDF hits targets across Gaza after arson attacks, readies for renewed fighting | The Times of Israel 6/17/21

Islamic Jihad: We’ll hit back if Israel continues Gaza strikes | The Times of Israel 6/19/21

Bennett warns Hamas: ‘Our patience has run out’ | The Times of Israel 6/20/21

Bennett: Iran ‘regime of executioners’ can’t get the bomb | The Jerusalem Post 6/20/21

Updated Forecast: 80% likelihood you read all the updated forecasts.

Xinjiang Camps

While there has been no substantive reporting or news around the concentration camps in Xinjiang except for the general human rights condemnation by the G7 of China’s actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, I still feel the need to update this forecast. While the largest factor is again the passage of time, there are a few other factors in play:

1. What incentive does China have to close the camps except for positive Western PR?
2. What more evidence could the Western populace want in order to create a demand for their governments to put adequate pressure on China to close the camps? There are existing allegations of organ harvesting and countries have called China’s actions genocide and crimes against humanity?
3. The Biden - Putin Summit revealed the growing limits of US influence and pressure, and so it is increasingly unlikely for the US to be able to force China’s hand here unilaterally.

Forecast

Will China's internment camps for Uyghurs remain open on 2022-01-01? | Updated: 95% 📈+2 (Metaculus: 97%)

Our Take: I considered updating the forecast to 98%, however there is still an outside chance China achieves their stated goals for the camps and closes them by the end of year.

Yemen Civil War

Finally, I turn our attention to the ongoing civil war in Yemen where fighting has been taking place for nearly seven years with over 200,000 dead. While Saudi air raids have been halted in the recent past to boost the peace efforts, this otherwise signal is overshadowed by the foundation of the peace talks. As pointed out by a recent Foreign Policy article, the terms of the peace treaty proposed by both the US and Saudi Arabia are unfavorable to the Houthis despite their clear dominance and victory in the civil war. The result is that fighting is likely to continue unless either the US and Saudi Arabia rapidly change their approach to the peace process or the Houthis outright win the civil war by the end of the year.

Forecast

Will there be a cease-fire or peace agreement in the Yemeni Civil War by 2022-01-01? | Updated: 11% 📈+2 (Metaculus: 27%)

Our Take: These conflicting narratives have created two different forecasts for whether there will be peace or a ceasefire in Yemen this year. One lowers the forecast to 8%, the other raises it to 14%. For now, the two forecasts will be averaged but if you have insight into which narrative is more likely to win please let me know in the comments.

Negative Signals

Washington Has Yemen Policy Backward: The Houthis have defeated Saudi Arabia—and peace won’t come by dictating terms to the victors | Foreign Policy 6/3/21 by Annelle Sheline

Mixed Signals

Yemeni officials say battle for key city intensifies | Associated Press via Yahoo! News 6/20/21

Positive Signals

Yemen air raids halted to boost peace efforts: Saudi-led forces | Al Jazeera 6/10/21

In episode 5 of The Right Side of Maybe, Clay from Global Guessing talks to Datscilly, the top-ranked forecaster on the Metaculus leaderboards. Only 18th months after he first started forecasting, Datscilly won nearly $50,000 in the IARPA Geopolitical Forecasting Challenge 2 where he placed second. How did Datscilly improve his skills so quickly? What was his strategy for excelling in a competition setting? And how is he able to get to the right side of maybe before others so quickly, so reliably, and so often? Datscilly answers these questions and more, while also diving dive into a particular forecast relating to Ebola on Metaculus which he did particularly well on.

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